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The Formation of Wenzhou Footwear Clusters: How were the 
Entry Barriers Overcome? 
Zuhui Huang  Xiaobo Zhang  Yunwei Zhu 
 
 
Wenzhou used to be one of the poorest regions in eastern China. With limited arable land, poor 
road access to major cities, and little support from the government, it seemed to lack all the 
necessary conditions for economic growth according to the standard textbook. However, over the 
past several decades, Wenzhou has achieved one of the fastest growing rates and owned the most 
dynamic private sector in China. The footwear  industry in particular has grown from a negligible 
place to the largest market share and has formed one of the largest industry clusters in China. 
Therefore, the footwear industry provides us with a good example to understand the driving forces 
behind the dramatic rural industrial growth. For this study, we undertake a survey on about 140 
enterprises at different scales in Wenzhou. The survey enables us to examine how the start-up 
capital, credit, technology, and institutional barriers have been overcome in the formation process. 
 
1. Introduction 
Wenzhou is located in the south-eastern part of Zhejiang Province and was predisposed for 
economic development. In 1978, Wenzhou City had a population of 5,612,600.    Its arable land 
area was a meager 2,900,000 mu (equivalent to 0.52 m per capita; 1/3 of the national average) 
(Zhang Renshou, Li Hong, 1990). Additionally, Wenzhou’s proximity to Taiwan made it a likely 
war frontline. Hence, neither the central nor the provincial (Zhejiang) governments were inclined 
to spare limited resources for Wenzhou’s infrastructural and industrial development (Tsai, 2002). 
From 1949 to 1981, only 655 million yuan, or approximately 20 million yuan annually on average, 
were invested on the  region (Zhang Renshou, Li Hong, 1990). Wenzhou suffer ed from poor 
transportation, relying upon a single narrow mountain road for transportation of people and goods
1, 
and consequently did  not provide potential for industrialization.   
Prior to reform, Wenzhou was one of the poorest regions in eastern China. With limited 
arable land, poor road access to major cities, and little support from the government, it seemed to 
lack all the necessary conditions for textbook economic growth, Nevertheless, since the economic 
reform in the late 1970s,  several industries thrived in the region.  The footwear industry in 
particular has grown from a negligible size to the largest share in the market and has formed one 
of the largest industry clusters in China.   
With such unfavorable initial conditions, how did the new entrants succeed in overcoming 
the obstacles and constraints such as technology, start-up capital, etc. and begin the clustering 
process? What are the major factors that contributed to its formation? What lessons can be drawn 
from this success story? The footwear industry provides us with a good example to understand the 
                                                                   
1 Wenzhou Airport and Jin-Wen Railway were respectively completed in 1990 and 1998.     2
driving forces behind this  dramatic rural growth. Little work has been previously made to examine 
these questions. This study aims to fill this knowledge gap.  
This paper provides an overview of the Wenzhou footwear cluster and of our survey design in 
Section 2. It demonstrates how new entrants overcome the technological, capital and institutional 
barriers in Section 3 to 5 respectively. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the major findings and draws 
some lessons from this case. 
 
2. An overview of the Wenzhou footwear cluster and survey design 
The traditional shoemaking industry has a history of over 500 years in Wenzhou. In the Ming 
Dynasty, Wenzhou footwear was produced exclusively for the courts due to its exquisiteness and 
quality. At the end of the Qing Dynasty and  the beginning of the Republic of China, the Wenzhou 
shoemaking industry began to flourish. The Fuqian Street in the city was then lined with dozens of 
footwear stores and became a unique footwear street. 
In the 1920s, Shanghai, Xiamen and other cities employed workers from Wenzhou to make 
shoes.  The shoemakers, through their work experience, mastered the advanced  shoemaking 
process. When these skilled workers came back to Wenzhou, they became the key technicians in 
the local shoemaking  industry. This batch of workers had a far-reaching influence on the 
development of  the contemporary shoemaking industry in Wenzhou, especially i n i mproving 
shoemaking technology.   
In 1950, there were 43 family footwear workshops and 103 employees in urban Wenzhou.
2 
Since then, Wenzhou  footwear  industry went through two social movements;  the  socialist 
transformation movement in which many private workshops and factories were nationalized or 
closed, and the (write in the other social movement) movement. By 1978, there were only 19 
footwear factories left, including two state-owned, eight collectively owned and nine privately 
owned with a yearly combined output of 496,800 pairs.
3  These factories are the “seed factories” 
which trained and accumulated a good number of technical workers, marketing and management 
talents and provided the basis for the emerging of the Wenz hou shoemaking industry in the 
context of opening and reform. After 1978, the Wenzhou shoemaking industry recovered rapidly. 
As state-owned and collective-owned businesses gradually went out of business, more and more 
employees set up their own factories, and the local shoemaking business boomed. By the end of 
1981, there were 99 shoemaking factories in the Lucheng district of Wenzhou alone. After over 20 
years’ development, Wenzhou has now become the most important footwear production base, and 
is called the “Footwear City of China”. As shown in figure 1, Wenzhou gradually formed a highly 
specialized and coordinated industrial cluster consisting of over 4000 shoemaking factories (over 
30 leading companies with yearly output value of more than 100 million yuan), over 200 leather 
enterprises, over 380  footwear sole enterprises, over than 200  footwear machine manufacture 
enterprises, 168 footwear last enterprises, over 100 footwear accessories and ornamental materials, 
over 50 footwear-sample design and drawing offices and abundant household factories, in addition 
to specialized footwear-related information service agents, training schools and research institutes. 
These enterprises, institutions and households are linked together via numerous specialized 
                                                                   
2 Wenzhou City Annals, Zhang Zhicheng, Wenzhou City Annals Compilation Committee, Beijing, Chunghua 
Bookstore, 1998 
3 Wenzhou City Annals, Zhang Zhicheng, Wenzhou City Annals Compilation Committee, Beijing, Chunghua 
Bookstore, 1998     3
markets, such as the Wenzhou “Footwear City” Market, the Hetonqiao Footwear Accessories & 
Ornamental Materials Market,  the  South Zhejiang  Footwear Accessories  and Ornamental 
Materials Market, the  Original Leather Market, Leather  and  Footwear Machine Market and the 
Leather Chemical Market, etc. In 2004, the total output of the Wenzhou footwear cluster amounted 
to 835 million pairs (including 452,980,000 leather shoes, 3,440,000 cloth shoes, 378,630,000 
rubber shoes)
4 and employs over 400,000 people.
5 Table 1 shows the yearly output and export 
status of shoes during 2001-2004.   
 
 

































                                                                   
4 Wenzhou Statistical Yearbook (2005). 
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Table 1 Annual Output and Export of the Wenzhou Footwear Industry 
Year   Annual output value 
( billion???)  
Growth rate 
( %)  
Export value 
( US$ million)  
Growth rate 
( %)  
2001  249  -  462  - 
2002  263  5.62  667  44.37 
2003  307  16.73  837  25.49 
2004  346  12.70  1149  37.28 
 
It is interesting to observe that the footwear cluster formed in Wenzhou where, despite having 
neither  a legal nor a  financial system  which is well developed by existing standards, private 
enterprises have mushroomed in the last two and a half decades. To address the questions 
mentioned in Section 1, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Zhejiang 
University conducted a joint survey in Wenzhou.   
The investigation work was conducted by collecting related literatures and documents and  by 
interviewing numerous individuals including as key persons in the  local societies, competent 
government authorities as well as some senior predecessors and insiders.  Concurrently, we 
conducted further informal interviews with managers of some middle-small enterprises of the 
footwear cluster to design and pretest our questionnaires and then finished them. From July to 
October 2005, we conducted the formal field survey, covering the key footwear production bases, 
including the first phase and second phase “ Footwear City of China” industrial park in  the 
Lucheng district of Wenzhou City, the  Shuangyu Industrial Park of Lucheng District, the Oubei 
Township of Yongjia County and the Shenting Township of Ruian City and so on. We randomly 
selected our investigation targets from the list provided by local government or administrative 
departments of the industrial parks, and send one investigator to talk to the key responsible people 
face to face and to finally fill in the questionnaire according to the information obtained. We 
surveyed 140 existing footwear enterprises
6 including enterprises producing finished products or 
parts of supplies, which account for 2.77% of the total enterprises of Wenzhou footwear cluster. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the survey.   
Table 2 Statistics summary of the survey 





Sample/ total   Minimum**  Maximum**  Mean**  Std. 
Deviation
** 
Final products*  121  4000  3.03%  3  3500  459  547 
Footwear sole  4  380  1.05%  30  1100  570  612 
Footwear last  2  168  1.19%  10  80  45  49 
Leather  4  200  2.00%  8  170  62  74 
Accessories & 
ornamental Materials 
7  100  7.00%  30  200  75  66 
Footwear Machinery  2  200  1.00%  90  500  295  290 
                                                                   
6 We also attempt to investigate those founders of footwear enterprises who have vanished or changed their 
businesses or had to give up due to the difficulty.   5
Total  140  5048  2.77%  3  3500  427  531 
* The final footwear products including leather shoes, leisure shoes, safety footwear and children's shoes etc. 
** Number of the employers at the end of 2004. 
Source: Field survey by authors. 
 
3. Overcoming technology barriers 
3.1 Features of the Entrepreneurs  
Table 3 displays the number of sample enterprises, the average years of schooling and years 
of Chuangdang
7of the founders, and the composition of their occupational backgrounds at the 
time of their entry into the footwear industry. 
Table 3 Characteristics of enterprise founders 
  1980 and before  1981-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995  1996-2000  2001-2005 
No. of enterprises  4  18  27  31  38  22 
Years of schooling  6.25  7.97  8.02  9.03  9.70  9.18 
Years of Chuangdang  5.00  7.38  8.50  9.68  11.16  14.53 
Occupation 1( %)              
 Farmers  0.00  11.11  18.52  16.13  13.16  13.64 
 Factory works  50.00  27.78  37.04  29.03  13.16  9.09 
  Salesmen of trades  25.00  33.33  25.92  35.48  50.00  54.54 
 Engineers  0.00  16.67  0.00   6.45  10.53  9.09 
 Managers  25.00  11.11  7.41   3.23   5.26  13.64 
Others  0.00  0.00  11.11   9.68   7.89  0.00 
Occupation 2( %)              
  Related to footwear     
  industry  
75.00  77.78  22.22  48.39  42.11  59.09 
Occupation 3( %)              
  Capable of Footwear 
making technique 
75.00  94.44  62.96  80.64  65.79  63.64 
Source: Based upon the data from authors’ field survey in Wenzhou. 
Years of schooling and years of Chuangdang are the average s of each respective group. 
Several interesting facts emerge from table 3: (i) At the beginning of opening and  reform, 
newcomers in the Wenzhou shoemaking industry increased rapidly and this trend lasted until the 
end of the last century. (ii) The years of schooling of the founders increased gradually along with 
the increase of the average education level in Wenzhou. This result corresponds to those of Sonobe, 
Hu and Otsuka (2004) in their inquiry into the  Wenzhou low-voltage electric appliances cluster. 
(iii) Before setting up their own enterprises, newcomers typically left home and worked elsewhere 
for many years and accumulated an increasing amount of non-local working experience which 
gradually exceeding the years of schooling in the  mid 1980s. Certainly, this was critical for the 
formation of  the  footwear cluster. Hu (2002) argued that market demand and  obtaining 
                                                                   
7 This refers to joining armies, doing business or working away from home. After leaving school, Wenzhou people 
tend to work or learn to do business across the country, as is an very important feature of Wenzhou people. 
Through these non-local experiences, they may accumulate human resources and social capital, and obtain 
precious market information.   6
information of  market demand are two of the four basic requirements
8  for the establishment of 
new enterprises. Market opportunities  can  be  found  everywhere;  therefore,  obtaining market 
information is highly important. Numerous residents of Wenzhou left home and worked in other 
places for long periods of time. While accumulating the human resources and social capital 
required for setting up their own businesses, they were exposed to information on related markets 
and hence quicker to grasp market opportunities and develop their own businesses in their own 
market.   
(iv) There are many notable points about the professional backgrounds of the newcomers.   
First, out of all the newcomers’ backgrounds, the least prevalent profession was the farmer. That 
has remained constant throughout the history of the market, whereas the newcomers who used to 
be workers and salesmen have changed remarkably in proportion.  Initially, the large majority of 
the newcomers used to be workers, but that has gradually declined over time. On the contrary, the 
proportion of former salespeople rose steadily from an initially  low proportion. These findings are 
similar to those of  Sonobe, Hu and Otsuka (2004). In the early stage, relatively high operating 
technologies and “know-how” constitute the main access barriers for early participants. As the 
market matures, sales and development capacity become more crucial.   
The early Wenzhou  shoemaking industry lacked  a specialized division of labor and 
coordination because the participants in this period produced whole shoes and set up footwear 
stalls and family workshops. Comparatively, the production of whole shoes requires high levels of 
technology.  Naturally,  the participants were technicians who used to work in state-owned or 
collective shoemaking enterprises. They used relatively small machines and manually produced 
shoes. The industry was dominated by skilled workers because the technology barrier prohibited 
peasants ignorant of shoemaking technologies  to enter. Due to diffusion, some specific production 
processes were separated and numerous specialized bases were  formed  as sub-clusters  and 
engaged in specific processing and production steps, intermediary or auxiliary products. With the 
increasing divisions, the  technology barrier gradually weakened and the production and supply 
capacity rose sharply, causing the market to undergo a fundamental change. In this new context, 
marketing capacity became crucial for new participants; only those who had customers and 
marketing capacity c ould  manage to exist and develop. This is the underlying reason  for  the 
increasing proportion of salespeople joining the industry. 
Secondly, while newcomers with a shoemaking background represented a large proportion 
initially, this proportion then declined. Prior to 1985, most of the participants used to work in 
related industries  but  afterwards  the ratio dropped sharply, especially during the mid and late 
1980s.  Lured by the  high profits of the  industry, many individuals without any shoemaking 
background entered. This led to the quality crisis of Wenzhou footwear products.
9  Subsequently 
the ratio of those with shoemaking backgrounds rose, but remained low. 
Thirdly, the newcomers with shoemaking technologies  were a large portion of the entrants in 
the early years but declined over time. This process has been even, however, with some periods of 
increases and the portion of newcomers with shoemaking technologies has remained relatively 
high. This further demonstrates the high technological barrier of the shoemaking industry as well 
as the overcoming of that barrier thr ough rich workers with footwear-making technologies.  That 
overcoming of the technological barrier in Wenzhou has  enabled the local industry to develop 
                                                                   
8 The other two are having or raising the minimum funds and acquiring production technologies. 
9 This was marked by the burning of Wenzhou shoes in Hangzhou Wulin Plaza in 1987. Wenzhou shoes became a 
noun for substandard shoes in the 1980s.    7
rapidly.   
3.2    The Diffusion of Footwear-Making Technique and Knowledge   
Following China’ opening and  re form, traditional state-owned and collective  shoemaking 
enterprises gradually declined, and  skillful technicians, sales people, managers and the retired 
set up their own factories.  Subsequently, through master-apprentice relationships,  shoemaking 
technologies rapidly spread. The thick line in  Figure  2  represents the diffusion process of 
production and technology in the period.  The process mainly includes the following aspects:     8 
 
Figure 2 Diffusion of footwear production technique and knowledge in Wenzhou 
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  (i)  Skillful technicians, sales people, managers and retired people who used to work for 
state-owned or collective enterprises set up their own private enterprises. At the turn of the 1980s, 
when China's command economy was starting to transit into a market economy, footwear products 
were undersupplied.  However, the strong market demand and economic return attracted many 
people working in state-owned or collective  footwear factories, especially technicians, to set up 
their own footwear  stalls or family workshops and produced the whole shoe by themselves. Due to 
the highly technological requirements for the production of a whole  shoe, the newcomers were 
mainly technicians who typically used  littl e machinery  and manually produced  shoes.  A 
representative enterprise is  the state  owned Dongfanghong Leather  Footwear Factory. Three 
enterprises were derived from it, namely Jierda Footwear Co., LTD., China Aolun shoes Co., LTD., 
and Wenzhou Dashun Footwear Machinery Manufacture Co., LTD. In addition to these three big 
ones, there are also numerous smaller enterprises, such as the Tailong Footwear Last Factory etc. 
Table 4 displays the former work background of these four enterprises’ founders. 
 
Table 4 : Backgrounds of the founders of 4 enterprises derived from  the 
Dongfanghong Shoemaking Factory 
Name of Enterprise  Founders  Positions in Dongfanghong before setting 
up enterprises 
Jierda Footwear  Co., LTD.  Yu Ashou  Head of workshop   
China Aolun shoes Co., LT D.  Yao 
Wanfu 
In charge of production 
Wenzhou Dashun Footwear Machinery 
Manufacture Co., LTD. 
Xia 
Zhengyi 
In charge of machine repair 
Tailong Footwear Last Factory  Huang 
Yongbin 
Senior technician 
     Source: authors’ field survey. 
 
  (ii) The master-apprentice mode boosted footwear production and technology diffusion in 
Wenzhou. The most typical example is Mr. Yu Ashou, the founder of Jierda Footwear  Co., LTD. 
He taught  a total of  16 students of whom 15 set up their own companies while the last one became 
his son-in-law and worked in Jierda Footwear Co., LTD. (Yuan Yaping, 2003). 
(iii) Copying and spin-offs further increased footwear production and the rate of technology 
diffusion. As a matter of fact, the formation of an industrial cluster is also a process of production 
and technology diffusion and dissemination through copying of  others. Success of one enterprise 
often lures other s to copy, resulting in numerous enterprises being duplicated. As far as Wenzhou’s 
diffusion and dissemination channels are concerned, this process is accomplished through relatives 
and friends (Zhu Kangdui, 2005). This  phenomenon pushes industrial diffusion and boosted the 
formation of the Wenzhou shoemakingr cluster
10. 
 
3.3 Division of Labor Lowers Technological Threshold 
                                                                   
10 Aokang and Hongqingting are two typical examples. Two carpenters, Wang Zhentao and Qian Jinbo left home 
and worked elsewhere and later sold shoes together until in 1988  when they co-founded a leather shoe factory. In 
1995, due to difference in personalities, the factory was separated into the existing Aokang Group and 
Hongqingting Group. Following this, the two groups made great progress and became leading companies of their 
type in China.   10 
Whereas  it is generally  recognized that specialized divisions can improve production 
efficiency (Smith,  1776; Yang Xiaokai, Huang Youguang, 1996),  its role in breaking through 
industry access barriers is often neglected. Our investigation shows that the specialized division of 
labor simplified complicated production which not only lowered technological and access capital 
barriers
11  but also took full advantage of the entrepreneurs’ capacities.   
First, the specialized division initially decomposes very complicated footwear products into 
numerous intermediary products, thereby providing opportunities for households without 
shoemaking backgrounds or access to technology required for shoemaking. Table 5 shows the  7 
categories and over 20 varieties of intermediary products into which the process of producing a 
pair of shoes can be divided, from which newcomers can choose according to their technological 
capacity. 
 
Table 5 Intermediary products of shoes 
Assortments  Intermediary products 
Upper of footwear  Leather, PV leather, PVC leather, etc. 
Sole of footwear  Outsole, Mid-sole, Insole, Heel, Sock lining, Heel pad, etc. 
Lining of footwear  Fore-lining, Back-lining, Sponge, Cloth material, Foam, etc. 
Materials of footwear  Filament, Cement( Rubber cement, Neoprene), Crepe, etc. 




Footwear buckle, Slide fastener, Lace, Edging, Elastic band, etc. 
Packing Materials  Box/Carton, Brand, Lag label ticket, Tissue paper, Drying Agent, 
etc. 
     Source: Author’s field survey. 
 
Secondly,  the  specialized division of labor decomposes the initially rather complicated 
shoemaking process into relatively simple  steps; hence, remarkably reducing the  technical 
difficulty. Some auxiliary production steps in the production process can even accommodate the 
elderly, the weak, the disabled and the young. Our investigations in the rural Yongjia County of 
Wenzhou have found that women used simple tools to assemble small metal components like shoe 
accessories and shoe buckles during slack farming season.       
Finally, specialized divisions can also m ake better use of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs of the 
enterprises have different capacities; competent entrepreneurs can accommodate more working 
steps into the enterprise or  expand their enterprises through vertical integration, whereas less 
competent entrepreneurs may engage one or several steps at the  appropriate scale. Therefore, 
specialized divisions can adequately exploit the potential of rural entrepreneurship (Hayami, 
Kikuchi and Marciano, 1998) that is abundant in villages and local towns in Wenzhou. This also 
accommodates entrepreneurs with different capacities into the production chain and transforms 
these capacities into real profit.    
 
                                                                   
11 Division of labor can remarkably lower its access capital threshold, i.e. decompose the shoemaking chain into 
numerous steps requiring variable investments. Different households may choose different steps according to their 
fund, financing capacity, and risk-bearing capacity, thus even the households with scanty capital can be 
accommodated into the process and take up some labor-required work. We will dedicate another paper to analysis 
on how to lower access capital threshold.   11 
4. Overcoming the capital barriers 
4.1 Entry barriers of start-up capital investments 
The lack of access to adequate start-up capital has been recognized as an important deterrent 
to small enterprise development and growth. Many authors (Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Pretes, 2002; 
Schreiner and Woller, 2003; Hernandez-Trillo etc., 2005) stress that it is very difficult for  most 
small enterprises to obtain support from formal financial institutions. This is especially true when 
the founders setting up small and medium sized enterprises often lack sufficient mortgages or 
guarantee. In these cases, banks are generally cautious in issuing start-up loans. This has also 
emerged in our investigation. Among the 140 enterprises we surveyed, only two had obtained 
bank loans. One was founded in 1996 with an investment of 500,000 yuan, including a  40% bank 
loan; the other was founded in 2000 with an investment of 500,000 yuan, including a 20% bank 
loan. How did Wenzhou shoemakers overcome capital shortages when formal financial aid could 
not be obtained in order  to meet start-up fund requirements? Among the 140 enterprises we 
surveyed, 20 failed to respond or give clear answers and 2 were new enterprises. If we deduct 
these 22 enterprises from the total, 118 enterprises remain upon which we based our analysis.   
 
These 118 enterprises made a combined initial investment of 19,701,100 yuan, with each 
making the average investment of 160,700  Yuan. Table 6 shows that the enterprises differ 
significantly in terms of start-up capital , ranging from 500 to 3,567,400  Yuan
12 as a result of 
different start-up capital and production link choices. In terms of the  minimum, maximum and 
average values in different periods, the total start-up fund increases over time, showing that 
whereas the industry threshold rises, the minimum investment requirements for different periods 
remain relatively low. This shows that access capital requirements were still quite small and that 
average households can enter at an appropriate scale matching their accumulated fund plus the 
informal finances.   
 
Table 6   Start-up funds required for 118 enterprises during different periods 
( ’000 yuan)  
Years  Number  Minimum   Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation 
1980 and before   4      0.5  70.7  20.9  33.5 
1981-1985  14  0.9  225.3  35.0  61.1 
1986-1990  25  2.5  312.7  66.1  91.7 
1991-1995  27  0.5  272.1  64.9  72.2 
1996-2000  32  11.1  3,567.4  246.2  612.7 
2001-2005  16  8.9  3,095.7  490.3  914.5 
All samples  118         
Note: All the initial investment values are revised by the price index of fixed capital investment of Zhejiang 
province which is obtained from the Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook and the China Statistics Yearbook. 
Note: Among all the enterprises founded in 1996-2000, two enterprises have a start-up fund  of 3,567,400 and 
3,095,700 yuan respectively. If these two enterprises are excluded in our calculation, then the average start-up 
funds of the two periods are only 139,000 and  160,700 yuan respectively. 
Source: Calculated from data collected by authors. 
 
                                                                   
12 The Kangnai Group had an initial investment capital of only 500 yuan when it was found in 1980, and now it 
becomes one of the biggest and also most outstanding shoemakers. At present, it owns 14 advanced automatic 
production lines and output reached 1.2 billion yuan in 2004.   12 
Table 7 shows the values of various sources of funds and their percentage in the total start-up 
capital.  The data shows that 66.37% of the start-up fund came from  individual investments, 
24.94% from direct relatives and friends of the founders, 8.35% from social fund raising or other 
resources, and only a negligible 0.34% from banks.   
 
Table 7   Sources of start-up funds of 118 shoemaking enterprises 
  Start-up 
fund 











1970.11  1307.48  287.00  204.40  6.79  43.58  120.86 
Weight 
(%) 
100.00  66.37  14.57  10.37  0.34  2.21  6.14 
Note: All the initial investment value are deflated by the price index of fixed capital investment of Zhejiang 
province, which is obtained from Zhejiang Statistics Yearbook and China Statistics Yearbook. 
Source: calculated according to the data collected by author’s field survey. 
 
Two aspects of the above results  are worth noting:  without formal financial support, 
Wenzhou shoemakers mainly relied on their own funds for start-up capital; most informal start-up 
capital came from relatives and friends while the more generic and market-oriented informal 
finance channel s, such as public fund raising,  were seldom used
13. We find that the enterprises 
preferred to borrow from relatives and friends (44.29%), followed by banks, accounting for 20%, 
then by those who raised funds through direct relatives, which only makes up 10.71%, and finally 
those choosing social fund-raising, which was used minimally.   
 
We  now  proceed to analyze how  these enterprises overcame working capital difficulties. 
Table 8 shows the number and proportion of enterprises with different preferred channels when 
they need working capital.   
 


















15  62  28  4  16  15  140 
Percentage
( %)  
10.71  44.29  20.00  2.86  11.43  10.71  100.00 
Source: Based upon authors’ field survey. 
 
What is the reason behind this? Further analysis shows that fund raised from direct relatives 
usually do not bear interest and have no definite payment deadline unless otherwise specified. 
Since the fund can also be used by the borrower for a relatively long period, such funds are often 
used for start -up capital or  ramp-up  capital expenditure. When working capital is required, 
                                                                   
13 Table 7 shows that, among the 118 enterprises, only 6 used proceeds raised from public channels, accounting for 
20%-67% in their initial investments respectively.   13 
enterprises tend to use delayed payment which is a common practice among upstream and 
downstream enterprises based upon trust and commitment.    These enterprises have formed  a 
relatively stable friendship relation after long term business cooperation. As they are engaged in 
the same products, well aware of the credit of each individual and pf enterprise development, and 
have  a multilateral default penalty mechanism  which  has been formed within a community, 
enterprise owners can use credit to pay various expenses, hence financial support and circulation 
gradually comes into existence.  Table 9  examines whether the 140 enterprises can purchase on 
credit goods provided by upstream enterprises. In fact, m ost investigated enterprises may do so 
within a credit term of no longer than 3 months. This shows that delayed payment has become an 
important channel for Wenzhou shoemakers to overcome their working capital shortage. On the 
other hand, banks are more willing to lend to those which can mortgage the fixed assets in which 
they invested during the start-up period. Therefore, some enterprises prefer bank loans when they 
need working capital. 
 
Table 9: Whether enterprises can purchase on credit goods provided upstream 
suppliers 
Credit allowed( credit period)    
1 month  
or  less 
1-2 months 
( inclu..  2 
months)  
2-3months 
( inclu..  3 
months)  
3-6months 
( inclu..  
6months)  













78  17  17  7  2  12  7  140 
Percentage
( %)  
55.72  12.14  12.14  5.00  1.43  8.57  5.00  100.00 
Source: Calculated from authors’ field survey. 
 
5. System Barrier Breakthrough   
The formation of  the  Wenzhou shoemaker cluster  was also a process of exploration and 
deepening of China’s opening and reform policies. At the beginning of this period, the founders of 
the  Wenzhou  shoemaking enterprises faced two system barriers: ownership risk caused by 
under-protection of private ownership; performance risk caused by  a lagging legal system.   
 
5.1 Avoiding ownership risk 
At the beginning of reform and opening, China had no market economy system in place. As a 
result, the property rights system was still constrained by politics especially since  the then top 
government leaders still disagreed on the direction of reform. C onsequently, private economic 
activities in this period were often branded as “illegal market activities” and suppressed by the 
police. Questions as how to circumvent ownership risk and obtain individual economic liberty 
were the main problems for the new shoemakers at this time. In order to avoid direct conflicts with 
the then current system  and ideology, seek for legal political protection, and reduce the high 
transaction cost and efficiency loss caused by the branding, many private enterprises resorted to 
some makeshift practices such as “Attaching them to a legal enterprise or organization” or wear a 
“red hat”
14-collective owned enterprise- to avoid ownership risk. Through these practices, they not 
                                                                   
14 Those that become affiliated with public enterprises were called “hang-on household enterprises” (or called 
“guahu qiye”), since they attached themselves to state-owned enterprises by paying to use their name, stationery, 
receipts, and account numbers. Those that chose to register as collectives with neighborhood or village   14 
only managed to legalize their private enterprises, but also to effectively enlarge fund resources. 
Local government was also not negligible in this process as their acquiescence and even support 
towards these private innovations (Zhang Renshou, Li Hong, 1990) enabled Wenzhou shoemakers 
to break through the then system barriers and circumvent the crucial ownership risk. 
   
5.2 Reduce Contract Performance Risk 
 
The efficient functioning of markets requires that some organization enforce contracts and 
property rights. To be credible, the organization that enforces contracts and property rights must 
have the power to force people to adhere to its decisions.( Haber, North & Weingast, 2003 
However, given that the legal system is incomplete and a  credit system has yet to be set up, the 
cost of enforcing contracts by legal means, such as by courts, is very high and often impractical 
because the value of unit transactions is small relative to the litigation cost (Hayami, Kikuchi and 
Marciano, 1998). Therefore, in this situation, it is very impractical to rely only on the system to 
improve market efficiency, reduce performance risk and transaction cost. In our survey, we 
examine  the issue of how Wenzhou shoemakers  generally  solve contractual conflicts among 
enterprises. Table 10 presents the results of this analysis.   
 
Table 10: Solutions Usually Adopted to Solve Contractual Conflicts between 
Enterprises 












4  9  94  7  26  140 
Percentage
( %)  
2.86  6.43  67.14  5.00  18.57  100.00 
Source: Calculated according to the data collected by author’s field survey. 
Among the 140 investigated enterprises,  94 explicitly express that they usually solve 
contractual conflicts through out-of-court negotiation, and only 4 would like to “go to court”.    
Due to  the incomplete legal system, going to court costs not only money but also energy in China. 
Furthermore, even though a party wins a lawsuit, it may not help much. Consequently,   
negotiation out of court  is  used  as a substitute for  formal contract performance.  Under these 
circumstances, how do Wenzhou  shoemakers deal with performance risk? We find that resorting to 
market force, i.e.  the  creative establishment of various specialized markets, e.g.  Footwear 
Accessories & Ornamental Materials Market, Original Leather Market, Leather &  Footwear 
Machine Market, and Leather Chemical Market etc., to facilitate concentrated transaction, may be 
an important aspect.  Sonobe et al. (2002) argue that the local marketplace, where enterprise 
managers can easily purchase materials and sell products to local traders, plays a critical role in 
stimulating the entry of new enterprises in the early stage of cluster development. Specialized 
markets not only facilitate transaction, but also help to maintain pressure on transaction partners, 
and consequently reduce risk of transaction failure. (Yang Xiaokai, Huang Youguang, 1999) The 
more potential transaction partners on the market, the more replaceable the transactions become. 
In this case, even though the original partner fails to perform the contract, the loss incurred would 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
committees were said to “wear a red hat”. (Tsai, 2002)   15 
become  reduced.  In the meantime, having substitutes leads  competitors to enhance transaction 
efficiency.  Therefore, the formation and development of specialized markets not only addresses 
issues such as “product market” and “information” but also effectively reduces the transaction cost 
incurred  due to the  underdeveloped credit system and legal environment at the beginning of 
China’s opening and reform, improve transaction efficiency and boost the formation of Wenzhou’s 
shoemaker  cluster.     
   
6. Lessons from this case 
China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law, finance and growth literature: 
neither its legal nor financial system is well developed by existing standards, yet it has one of the 
fastest growing economies (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005). As an area of fast growth in China’s 
private economy, Wenzhou provides an example for both China and the rest of the world. Using a 
field survey on Wenzhou’s  footwear cluster, we find that due to adverse conditions, such as a large 
population and relatively little land, and lack of resources, a great number of residents were forced 
to either leave home and find work elsewhere or became engaged in  the  production of small 
commodities.  They thereby developed a strong market sense and accumulated a good financial 
basis. After China’s opening and reform, Wenzhou’s entrepreneurs took advantage of  market 
opportunities based on the information they obtained outside of Wenzhou; they overcame a range 
of barriers in technology, capital and system, and made remarkable development. From this case, 
the following lessons emerge: 
The  study of the formation and evolution of the  Wenzhou footwear cluster contribution to 
economics in terms of theoretical models. Law, private property rights and effective m arkets are 
often viewed as prerequisites for economic development. However, the formation of  the cluster 
shows that well specified and developed property rights, the rule of law, a judicial system that 
enforces contracts, well financial system are important to economic development but are not 
necessary preconditions. In some sense, these factors are the consequences of economic 
development rather than  its prerequisites. The role of  the  informal system can  also  not be 
neglected. The innovations made by the entrepreneurs with respect to informal systems, such as 
“circumventing the red traffic light” and other  informal norms of behavior may make up for 
deficiencies in the formal system and facilitate economic development. As a matter of fact, the 
process of economic development itself is a process of continuous confrontation with new barriers 
and identification of new problems. The innovations of the entrepreneurs can overcome these 
barriers and problems over time and lead to greater development of the economy.   
     
The forming process of the footwear cluster shows that whereas an  initial disadvantageous 
environment restricts economic development it also creates opportunities. Wenzhou’s inconvenient 
location and poor transportation hindered economic development  in Wenzhou. However, these 
adverse conditions  (the  lack of natural resources and inconvenient location) forged a  unique 
regional social culture in Wenzhou such as a  mercantile culture, pioneering and adventurous, 
hardship enduring spirit, valuing local  relationship, etc. These factors played a significant role in 
the formation of the footwear industry in Wenzhou. The establishment of the “Wenzhou Mode” is, 
in a sense, the result of being cornered by disadvantageous factors. The large number  of farmers 
and relatively insufficient arable land in rural areas (per capita arable land of less than 0.5mu, 
equal to 333.34m
2) resulted in an oversupply of labor in Wenzhou. Meanwhile, the development 
of rural collective enterprises was low due to the lack of vigorous support from modern industry 
which was also very weak.   16 
From the perspective of system  and economical  reform,  inferior  transportation was an 
advantage  at the beginning of China's reform and opening. I n  an age of poor information 
communication, remote and inaccessible areas were  less subject to governmental influence and 
control, and hence more favorable to those things in exploration stage or which were temporarily 
prohibited. This is an important reason behind the bottom-up private economy development and 
the existence and development of market-oriented reform in Wenzhou at the beginning of opening 
and reform in China.  Due to the success, the “Wenzhou mode” and experience were gradually 
accepted and highly recognized. It became an unforeseen driving force behind the market oriented 
reform and economic development across China. In this sense, the formation and evolution of the 
Wenzhou shoemaker cluster is not only significant in itself, but also as a means to understand and 
to interpret the development of China’s economy and system transformation.   
   17 
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